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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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CLOVIS MAQSUD, ARAB LEAGUE REPRESENTATIVE, DISCUSSES HIS MISSION

Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English 20-26 Aug 79 pp 18-23

[Interview with Clovis Maqsud, Arab League representative to Washington, by Micheline Hazou, date and place not given]

[Text]

The recent abortive coup in Iraq has introduced "an element of suspicion" into Iraqi-Syrian relations, according to Dr. Clovis Maqsoud, who has just been appointed the Arab League's representative in the United States.

Speaking to Monday Morning shortly before leaving for Washington to take up his new post last week, Maqsoud said, "Recent developments in Iraq have tended to bring back memories of the tension and alienation that has characterized the relation between (Iraq and Syria), but it is noticeable and worth emphasizing that the two states have refrained from resorting to mutual accusations and recriminations..."

He added: "It is hoped that the imminent danger which the Egyptian-Israeli treaty poses to our national rights, and even our existence, will be a sufficient impetus for both Syria and Iraq to bring into focus the national requirement of abolishing any tension to regain a status in the equation between these two countries."

Maqsoud, whose mandate as Arab League representative starts on September 1, dismissed the signs of post-coup tension between Baghdad and the Palestine Liberation Organization as a passing phenomenon which would not affect the "strategic relations" between Iraq and the Palestinian Revolution.

Attributing the strains to "ideological differences between certain elements of the Palestinians and certain elements of Iraq," Maqsoud said that attaching exaggerated importance to hostile public statements "would serve those who have a vested

interest in the breakdown of the Arab national cohesion which was achieved during the (November, 1978) Baghdad conference and must be maintained..."

In a reference to last week's attempt on the life of the Iraqi ambassador in Beirut, Abdullhussein Muslem Hassan, Maksoud said the incident "shows clearly the continued vulnerability of Lebanon" and underscores the fact that "every adverse development in inter-Arab relations is bound to have some negative influence on the Lebanese crisis."

He added: "This is why Lebanese diplomacy has a vested interest in the promotion of Arab cohesion, stability and mutual understanding. The Lebanese realize that Arab consensus facilitates the restoration of Lebanese consensus" and that "the continued Israeli threat in the South of Lebanon cannot be properly deterred and ultimately terminated except by the creation of Arab strategic coordination..."

"Parenthetically, PLO-Lebanese coordination can be an access which can help salvage the Arab consensus in the face of the many challenges to it."

About his mission in the United States, Maksoud said it would be his task to explain to the Americans why the Arabs are opposed to the Camp David agreements and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, drive home to them the regional dangers posed by the plight of Lebanon (especially the South), and enhance their understanding of the Palestinian problem.

He said:

The recent abortive coup in Iraq: What and who was behind it?

In the Third World in general, where the institutional infrastructures are still weak or in their embryonic stages, there is a proclivity to violence which is reduced in direct proportion to the development and viability of institutions.

Therefore, the so-called attempted coup in Iraq and the subsequent unfortunate events are a manifestation of changes taking place in a manner that is turbulent, distressing and painful.

In many ways, the Third World experiences the psychological trauma of wanting to change rapidly. The urge for liberation in many instances takes prece-

dence over, but does not necessarily exclude, the urge for liberty. Because of the coercive nature of colonial and neocolonial systems in the past, emphasis on national unity and hegemony was a preoccupation of all national liberation movements to secure the rapid achievement of independence. Suspension of differences spilled over into a suspension of the right of dissent.

In the post-independence periods of many Third World countries, the habit of suspending dissent was perceived in many instances as a protective measure, to preserve the fruits of liberation.

The groping for rapid change and societal transformation was interpreted by many of the ruling elites in the Third

World as a sufficient excuse to foreclose many of the individual freedoms that were long cherished by liberal traditions.

The notion of liberation broadened, becoming inclusive of freeing society of the socio-economic inequities that harassed the individual and emasculated him or her from the possibility of enjoying what the more developed world has accepted as elementary and axiomatic.

Consequently, ruling elites in the Third World sought to develop policies that had an input of ideological systems obtaining in the Western and Eastern worlds, but the urge for unique experimentation in political and social theory remained for many of the Third World power elites a vehicle to assert identity and, consciously or unconsciously, a search for authenticity.

In the midst of this ferment and simultaneously with this groping for a sense of direction, the dynamisms of change were bound to bring about situations where the priorities were seen as alternatives and not in the sequence that would have welcomed differences of opinion, entertained alternative options and enabled as large a number of people as possible to partake in the determination of national priorities.

It is from this viewpoint that alternative plans were perceived as carriers of alternative elites, and thus elites of all sorts in most parts of the Third World became protective of themselves and hence suspicious of alternatives.

This general background, applicable in one form or another, constitutes the backdrop for most of the violent events and traumatic experiences in many parts of the Third World.

It is, however, regrettable that human suffering is not avoided as consciously as I would like it to be, and in many instances crises of conscience are not always easily resolved.

This malaise is characteristic of most of the Third World societies, and although it cannot always be condoned, an effort must be made to understand them.

Because of the urge that changes should be rapid and expeditious, resort to revolutionary methods and behavior is deemed inevitable, and if the revolutionary situation acquires longevity, then it acquires its own logic.

Revolution, in the final analysis, is the instrument of restoring to the revolutionary course of human development its naturalness and its normalcy.

This is deemed necessary when the evolutionary process has been forcibly interrupted and stymied by an accumulation of forces of colonial or racist or coercive or backward social behavior, institutions and concepts.

Hence, to galvanize society takes precedence over the concept of the individual components of society. There is in the unfolding process of revolution a totality that can succumb to totalitarianism or can presage democratic participation.

In many parts of the Arab world and the Third World, the quest is obvious, the answer and the direction not yet clear, and the hope is for a decision in favor of democratic participation.

This mechanism of analysis means that any judgement is bound to be tentative and inconclusive, bearing in mind that in our groping for relevance in the world today, we must have the boldness to discuss our problems as well as the urge to advertise our achievements.

It is in this context that the recent events in Iraq or in Sudan or in Yemen or anywhere else must be seen, because to judge a historical situation in the light of incidents, however important, misses the point and thus might make us become the prisoners of the moment, eager to justify or rushing to condemn.

Iraqi-Syrian relations: What has happened to them after the Iraqi convulsion?

Recent developments in Iraq have tended to bring back memories of the tension and alienation that has characterized the relation between these two pivotal Arab states, but it is noticeable and worth emphasizing that the two states have refrained from resorting to mutual accusations or recriminations.

This does not mean that an element of suspicion has not been introduced.

It is, however, hoped that the imminent danger which the Egyptian-Israeli treaty poses to our national rights, and even our existence, will be a sufficient impetus for both Syria and Iraq to bring into focus the national requirement of disallowing any tension to regain a status in the equation between these two countries.

Historical responsibility on the part of the leadership of these two governments must, as previous experience has shown, take precedence over instant political events.

I have a feeling, corroborated by evidence, that retrieval of the intimacy of coordination will be possible and the hopes for unity that they have generated will be revitalized.

Iraqi-Palestinian relations: How are they developing, especially in view of the recent public attack on Baghdad by a senior Fatah official?

Iraq-PLO relations, like all states' relations with the PLO, are strategic in nature.

Relations in this respect are constant. The variables might at times introduce differences or even conflicts. But the strategic position of the constants in this equation is and must remain preponderant.

Because of ideological differences between certain elements of the Palestinians and certain elements of Iraq, it is inevitable that the public airing of them — a sign of a democratic formula that

governs relations — should lead to polemics at times taking forms which are not suitable for harmony but which, nevertheless, do not have to be stifled, since that would make harmony superficial rather than real.

My feeling is that the occasions in which statements were uttered were bound to have an emotive content which is partly personal and partly objective. In both instances, blowing any of these remarks out of proportion would serve those who have a vested interest in the breakdown of the Arab national cohesion which was achieved during the Baghdad conference and must be maintained in order to preempt the many inimical plans that the so-called peace treaty has conceived and is seeking to execute.

The Iraqi-Syrian coordination and steps towards unity are crucial to restore the strategic balance in the aftermath of the defection of Sadat's Egypt from the Arab framework and Arab power.

In this respect, the PLO has a vested interest in as much as the overall strategic balance in the area is a matter of deep concern for it to achieve its legitimate and internationally recognized national rights.

Iraqi-Soviet relations: In what direction are they moving after the abortive coup, and what is the significance of the recent message sent to Moscow by President Saddam Hussein?

Iraq's relations with the Soviet Union are determined by four major considerations.

1. Iraq is a principal member of the non-aligned movement.

Non-alignment is not an equidistant position between the two super powers, but it is definitely a declaration of independence from both super powers.

This independence means that at times a non-aligned country is closer to or more distant from one than the other. The objective of non-alignment, however, is that the countries connected to this policy must retain the freedom of action and movement in contrast to the constraints imposed by the military alliances of any of the contending military blocs and alliances.

2. Iraq's relations with the Soviet Union are also bilateral, and this is determined by the nature of the interlocking economic, diplomatic interests that have developed and which are in turn determined by the nature of priorities which each of the two countries has. In this respect, the Soviet Union and Iraq have a treaty of friendship which is still binding.

3. The Soviet Union's position on issues pertaining to the consequences of the Arab-Israeli conflict and to the Palestinian rights has been helpful to the Arab position, although not necessarily at all times identical with it.

This means that a dimension of understanding exists between the Soviets and the Arab states in general - and in this case, Iraq in particular. This understanding has been reinforced by the similarity of the Soviet Union's, Iraq's and other Arab states' assessment of the Camp David agreements and of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

4. The relations between the Soviet Union and Iraq are in the main states' relations. Hence, the ideological component does not and should not supersede the states, and ideological debate or conflict between the Baath and the Communists does not have a bearing on the states' relations, although at times it constitutes a factor in the attitudes of

each toward the other, and in moments of adversity it can infringe on the level of mutual understanding.

These four factors, in my view, constitute the elements which characterize the relationship between Iraq and the Soviet Union and perhaps the relationship between many of the Arab states and the Soviet Union.

Iraqi-Jordanian relations: Have they been affected by the recent developments?

Iraq and Jordan are bound by the resolutions of the Baghdad conference, and this is an important factor in inter-Arab relations at the present moment.

Internal developments in either of the two countries do not seem to influence the status of their bilateral relations although people in both countries share the overall anxieties that the Arabs share everywhere.

As long as the Baghdad resolutions constitute the principal determinant in inter-Arab relations, it is in the interest of both Jordan and Iraq, as well as all the signatories of the Baghdad conference, to maintain and sustain the national cohesion that has developed since then.

Insofar as Iraq is an oil-producing country, it has assumed its responsibility of underwriting not only the strategic diplomatic requirements of the Baghdad resolutions but also a major share of the economic prerequisites. Jordan, as is well known, is among the recipients of such assistance, and I am sure that it will so remain.

The Lebanese crisis: What effect are recent developments in Iraq and Syria likely to have on it?

Every adverse development in inter-Arab relations is bound to have some negative influence on the Lebanese crisis and situation.

The recent attempt at the life of the Iraqi ambassador shocked us all and shows clearly the continued vulnerability of Lebanon.

This is why Lebanese diplomacy has a vested interest in the promotion of Arab cohesion, stability and mutual understanding.

The Lebanese realize that Arab consensus facilitates the restoration of Lebanese consensus.

Furthermore, the continued Israeli threat in the South of Lebanon cannot be properly deterred or ultimately terminated except by the credibility of Arab strategic coordination.

So the Lebanese national interest lies in the continued functioning of the Arab consensus.

It is perhaps a revelation to some that both Lebanon and the PLO have an identical interest in bringing about maximum coordination among the Arab states and minimizing whatever setbacks have developed in these relations.

Parenthetically, PLO-Lebanese coordination can be an access which can help salvage the Arab consensus in the face of the many challenges to it.

Maksoud's mission in the U.S.: What does he plan to do and what does he plan to achieve?

This is the second time that I go to the U.S. as a special envoy of the Arab League.

The first time, after the October war and the oil embargo, I could say that my mission was characterized by excitement.

This time, my mission is characterized by challenge and an element of sadness.

Egypt, whose President has removed it

temporarily from Arab consensus and from the Arab framework, is so dear to any Arab who believes in the unity of this nation and in the positive role it can play on the world scene.

The Arab League which I will be representing will always include the Egyptian people, Egyptian interests and Egyptian aspirations.

Therefore, my primary concern will be to correct an imbalance in the U.S. caused by the euphoria of the Camp David agreements.

The U.S. must be exposed to the perception and policies of the Arab consensus as far as the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel is concerned.

This consensus must become an input in the opinion-making process in America, and hopefully in the decision-making process.

American opinion must come to grips with the reality of the motives that have made the Arabs object to and oppose the Camp David agreements.

This is to be done in order to enhance the Americans' ability to comprehend our collective views on this issue of paramount importance.

I deem my mission to be one of bridging the gap of misunderstanding, knowing full well that a reversal of policy is not easy or even possible, but that the damaging effect of adverseness towards the Arab consensus can be restricted.

Furthermore, the U.S. will sooner or later discover the validity and legitimacy of the Arab objection to the peace treaty, and then, when the time for reassessment of policy comes, a reassessment of attitude will have taken place.

There are people who say that the course that has been set by the Camp David agreements and the peace treaty is

irreversible and therefore any attempt to convey or communicate this Arab consensus is a mission impossible.

I do not believe so.

The U.S. is a persuadable entity. Insofar as they are an open society, American people are bound to be open-minded.

In this respect, we seek not so much agreement, but understanding; not so much identity of views, but the discovery of common purposes; not so much abandonment of positions, but refraining from being stuck to them.

Furthermore, the need in the U.S. to understand the plight of Lebanon, especially in the South, not only as a Lebanese tragedy but also as a major Arab problem, is a principal undertaking of the Arab League.

It is significant that the new secretary general of the Arab League Chedli Klibi chose Lebanon to be the first Arab country to visit, because it was the most violated Arab country and one that needs a collective Arab commitment.

It would be most useful for the Americans as well as the Arabs if the American opinion-makers were to understand that what is at stake in the South of Lebanon is far more than the geography of South Lebanon.

It is crucial that we alert the American public opinion to the destabilizing effect that continued Israeli aggression has on the whole region.

It is necessary to point out to American public opinion that since the signing of the treaty between Egypt and Israel, Israeli air attacks on the South of Lebanon have increased and become more intense, varied, violent, damaging and aggressive.

It is important for the U.S., that has sponsored this treaty in the hope that it will be a constraint upon the Israeli addiction to expansion and aggression, to understand that instead of that, the treaty acts almost as a license for Israel to play

havoc in the South and to develop a structured contempt on its part to the U.N. Security Council resolutions concerning Lebanon.

It will also be necessary during the next few months to confront the Zionist and Israeli attempts at distorting the Arab image and manipulating the energy problems of the U.S. to blacken the reputation and objectives of the Arabs. In this respect the Arab League considers that Israel's attempt to link certain steps towards American objectivity in attitudes and policies – such as American denunciations of the Israeli settlements on the West Bank and Gaza, its protestation against the use of American arms in Israel's aggressive forays into South Lebanon and other critical, however mild, remarks – as if they were a consequence of oil considerations rather than the outcome of policy judgements.

This Zionist campaign to distort the Arab image and purpose and insult American motives and judgements in criticizing Israel requires from us an explanation and exposure of Zionist techniques and attempts not only to discredit us but also to prevent genuine understanding and good relations amongst the Arab and American peoples.

During the next few months also, as in the past few months, much will be said and written about the PLO-American dialogue.

It will be necessary to enhance and intensify the prospects of the American public's understanding of the Palestine issue in all its ramifications, and insofar as the Palestine issue is the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict, this is a matter of general Arab concern, as well as Palestinian concern.

In this matter, much has to be learned, but perhaps more has to be unlearned.

Israel and the Zionists have been able to proliferate false terms that describe the Palestinians, their policies and their liberation movement and activities in abusive

words in a most intensively orchestrated semantic acrobacy.

It is crucial that uniform terminology develop that corresponds not to what America wants but what international resolutions and legitimacy have spelled out.

I believe that in the U.S. there is a belief that perhaps Israel and the Zionists are overplaying their cards. I believe there is a developing consciousness that "the other side" should be presented.

I think that in the U.S. there is a constituency of conscience that the Americans cannot afford to ignore and that the world must learn to appreciate.

CSO: 4820

OPPOSITION LEADER DEPLORES UNDEMOCRATIC PRACTICES, PEACE TREATY

Cairo AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 14 Jul 79 pp 36-37

[Interview with Khalid Muhyi al-Din: "The Democracy of al-Sadat Is the Democracy of One Man and One Party"; in Paris, date not given]

[Text] To those who do not know Khalid Muhyi al-Din up close, we say that he could have remained an active member of the Command Council of the 23 July 1953 Revolution and not left his post 2 years after the revolution in protest against undemocratic practices. The man has been honest with himself and his political and intellectual background. He refused to let iron rule be the price for consolidating the revolution.

It happened that Khalid Muhyi al-Din withdrew when Anwar al-Sadat, in the initial glow of his iron-rule concepts, was rejecting any democratic tendency during the meetings held by the officers who were members of the Council, and was also personally rejecting the commitment of Khalid Muhyi al-Din to the necessity of returning to parliamentary life.

For a quarter of a century the two have not changed. President Anwar al-Sadat has retained his iron-rule concepts, and Khalid Muhyi al-Din has continued to believe in the importance of parliamentary life. But what kind of parliamentary life?

Certainly not at all the kind inaugurated by President Anwar al-Sadat.

To those who do not know Khalid Muhyi al-Din up close, we also say that he is the only historical figure, despite his early withdrawal, to continue to preach what 'Abd al-Nasir began, and for years he has struggled for it—for the Arab identity of Egypt, the Palestinian identity of Egypt and the progressiveness of Egypt.

To those who do not know Khalid Muhyi al-Din, we say also that he heads the group which leads the Egypt which is not al-Sadat's Egypt and which will not be affected by the fact that in the elections President al-Sadat toppled the standard bearer of this group, Hajj Khalid Muhyi al-Din—hajj [religious pilgrim] despite his conviction that some Marxist principles tend to promote the development process in Egypt.

AL-MUSTAQBAL interviewed Khalid Muhyi al-Din during his visit to the French capital. Discussion centered on the current situation in Egypt, especially after the signing of the treaty with Israel, the dissolution of the People's Assembly and the holding of new elections, in the aftermath of which all the opposition forces were removed from the Assembly.

[Question] Many accusations have been made against you. The latest appeared in the magazine AL-HAWADITH. Will you explain your view of the report?

[Answer] The author of this article begins by criticizing al-Sadat's regime and accusing it of falsifying the recent elections and fulfilling its promise to topple opposition candidates. Then he says that I was toppled because the regime removed its umbrella from over me. The author of the article considered me responsible for all the abuses of democracy which have occurred in Egypt from 1952 to the present. Therefore, I want to discuss this topic plainly. I resigned from the Revolution Command Council in April 1954 in protest against the abolishment of parliamentary life and the restrictions imposed on the press. Since that date I have not assumed any post which would place me in a position of decision-making, whether before or after the death of President 'Abd al-Nasir. I have been busy in political life and have been a supporter of the orientation of the regime in its general policy. However, I have not been in a position of decision-making throughout the years of the revolution and thus am not responsible for the steps the regime has taken nor the mistakes it has committed, though this does not mean I have shirked responsibility.

The second point I want to make concerns elections in the People's Assembly. I ran for the first time in 1957 and faced competitors, some of whom gave up, and some of whom fell. There was the same situation in the elections of 1964 and 1969. In the elections of 1973 I was prevented from running. In 1976 I came back, was a candidate of the Unity [Tajammu'] Party and plunged into a savage battle. No one can say that al-Sadat's regime helped me in any way.

[Question] But isn't your accepting official responsibilities such as being board chairman of AKHBAR AL-YAWM kind of active participation in directing the regime's information?

[Answer] It doesn't matter. There is a difference between the press and responsibility for making top political decisions. Press censorship made an examination of my articles possible, though the period during which I assumed this responsibility was the only time when there was no real press censorship. I left the press the day the emergency regulations were imposed in 1964, after the Moslem Brotherhood case.

I did not intervene to prevent anyone from writing who had an opinion conflicting with mine. Muhammad al-Tab'i and others used to write with complete freedom during my administration of AL-AKHBAR AL-YAWM.

No Freedom in al-Sadat's Regime

[Question] Nasir's regime was accused of being undemocratic. Is there a great difference between yesterday and today?

[Answer] The principal point of controversy with the 23 July Revolution was a certain concept of democracy. I felt that it was up to the Revolution Command Council to put together a party and enter the elections with it. This would have given the revolution another course. However, this democratic line was not desired, and therefore I resigned.

When the revolution took another direction, and a social revolution was actually achieved, the main problem then was to protect the accomplishments of the revolution, and I supported this.

The Arab Socialist Union was the sole political organization, and I cannot claim to have participated in making this decision. However, while we were working in politics, we had to respect the slogan, "The art of the possible." In my opinion the experiment of the Socialist Union is 100 times richer than the present experiment of a multiplicity of parties. People used to know there was one organization and that freedom of movement was restricted to the political framework defined by this organization. The common citizen used to enjoy greater freedoms under the one-party regime. The current multiplicity of parties is multiplicity in form, because the government party (the National Democratic Party) is the new version of the Socialist Union. Either you join this party and all doors open for you, or you refuse and are persecuted. Al-Sadat's regime is a totalitarian regime, despite the fact that it never stops saying it is against totalitarianism. His regime is totalitarian in the full sense of the word. The recent emergency laws are the best proof of this, as are Law No 2 of 1977 which was issued after the events of 18 and 19 January 1977, stipulating the prohibition of parties or assembly anywhere; Law No 33 of 1978; and the latest Law No 36 of 1979, called the Law on Parties, which stipulates that all parties obligate themselves to the treaty. In politics there is nothing called "obligation." I am obligated to the Constitution only, and I also have the right to ask for its amendment. This is what the Unity Party promoted before the Parliament was dissolved.

Al-Sadat's regime is also totalitarian with regard to the press. There is a law stipulating that which is not represented in the Parliament by 10 deputies is not entitled to publish a newspaper. This is incomprehensible. A party can start out without deputies, continue party activity for 5 or 6 years and then reach the point of having deputies in Parliament as a result of its publicity efforts. This is impossible in Egypt now. The current regime claims to be democratic, but it is actually undemocratic, unlike the previous regime which had one party in which all political orientations moved, and problems were distributed in a reasonable fashion. Naturally there were attempts to dominate the Central Committee, but certain clean elements would succeed in reaching this committee through their own efforts.

[Question] Recently there were elections for the new People's Assembly, after President al-Sadat issued a resolution dissolving the old Assembly. Can you tell us about what really happened during these elections and about the decision to dissolve the Assembly?

[Answer] The decision to dissolve the Assembly was a political one. Al-Sadat made it to take advantage of the desire for change which the people live in the hope of achieving. Therefore he hastened to dissolve the Assembly before its session ended in 1981. The elections were held under martial law. It was a situation which had to come to an end, because the state of war had come to an end in accordance with the treaty. Al-Sadat has also tried to get rid of the opposition in Parliament, because he is now passing through a stage of breaking in relations with Israel, and he doesn't want any opposing view from the Assembly, even with regard to giving the shah the right to political asylum (It was the first decision made by the new Assembly). The matter was not raised for debate, but presented as a decree.

As for the circumstances in which the recent elections were held, since several factors contributed together to bring down the opposition and eliminate it from the Assembly, there is first of all the law on election propaganda issued on the eve of the elections. A violation of it causes a candidate to be removed from the elections, and we therefore followed the straight path.

The new law on the parties defines the necessity of the existing parties to obligate themselves to the treaty. The Unity Party opposed the treaty, and some doubt arose over the legitimacy of the party. The lack of a party newspaper led to a total information blackout from which candidates of the majority party benefited. The press contributed toward creating public opinion hostile to us by launching a direct attack against us. The public prosecutor joined in this campaign by publishing a declaration accusing a member of the Unity Party (Muhammad Isma'il 'Amir) of cooperating with the Iraqi Ba'th Party. It was noted that Khalid Muhyi al-Din had been summoned for questioning in the same case. That is not true, since I have received no summons so far from the office of the prosecution. The public prosecutor issued this declaration before the investigation of the case as part of the publicity campaign against the opposition. The case of the National Front Party members accused of having dealings with Bulgaria entered into this campaign too. A decision to release the accused was issued, without a guarantee of lack of proof of this charge.

Finally there is the absolute authority given governors by the law on local government. All means of the governorate were exploited and employed in favor of the National Party candidates. The commissioners, chiefs and citizens who work in the various agencies were subjected to numerous pressures. Everyone worked for the National Party candidates under threat of transfer and removal.

A law was issued 1 week before the elections stipulating that an identity card was necessary in the electoral process. The majority of Egyptian women, especially in the countryside, do not have an identity card. They have only

a family card. We lost thousands of votes because of this. This law was not applied in the districts reserved for the National Party candidates.

The elections were held in an atmosphere of terror never before experienced in Egypt. Armed gangs were used to pressure voters. The boxes arrived full, and our delegates were not permitted to be present when they were opened in the morning. The police informed us of this, but they remained apathetic.

Most of the Parties Are Against the Treaty

[Question] In your opinion what is the attitude of the people toward the treaty, and what attitude has the Unity Party and the other opposition parties adopted?

[Answer] There is great popular support of the treaty, not because of its outstanding conditions, but because the Egyptian citizen no longer has great hope for another method of solving the problem. Egyptian information has succeeded in convincing the people that the Arab countries are not earnest about either war or peace. In the face of this, he has come to feel that the treaty is the only way out of the problem even though the consequences of it might affect Egyptian sovereignty. Although one cannot deny the support which the treaty has received from a large proportion of the Egyptian people, there is a not insignificant number who oppose it. The Unity Party vehemently opposed al-Sadat's visit to Israel, and we have opposed the treaty from the beginning. In defining this opposition stand, we base our premise on the fact that the problem is mainly an Arab problem, not an Egyptian one, and that Egypt's security is tied to the security of the Arab countries and the security of Palestine. Other parties have opposed the treaty, including the Independents' Party, the National Front Party, the Independent Right and representatives of the religious current in the dissolved Assembly, Professor Kamal [sic] and Professor Salah Abu Isma'il. There is also opposition in the Egyptian streets from forces which are not represented in Parliament such as the Nasirites, the Marxists, the Wafd Party and the religious current outside the Assembly, etc. The common man on the street believes the propaganda, but the thinking political forces are against what is happening. Therefore, several laws have been issued to restrain this opposition which is being conducted in an official manner. These laws impede legitimate efforts and push people toward underground activity. Underground activity is widespread in Egypt, and with the loss of confidence in overt opposition, it may become a real force. Those who are working outside the law are becoming the majority, which is what happened in Iran, for example.

[Question] What is the domestic reaction to the Arab boycott of Egypt?

[Answer] The information organs are playing an extremely significant role in connection with this. First of all, they banned the appearance of any opinion opposing the treaty on the pages of newspapers. Then they began a campaign focusing on other Arab countries and showing the negative aspects

of certain Arab regimes. They take advantage of both the economic difficulties encountered by the people every day and manifestations of the high living enjoyed by some of our wealthy Arab brothers during their visits to Egypt. However, manifestations of wealth and high living are not limited to Arab tourists alone. There is a new class in Egypt which has benefited from the open-door policy and amassed great wealth during the past few years. This gives rise to the feeling that the problems are not taken seriously, there are those who are benefiting from the state of no war and no peace, and the people are the ones who are paying the price for all this.

The information apparatus has helped reinforce this hostile feeling toward the Arabs. It has forgotten or pretended to have forgotten that the great majority of the Arab people face the same problems, and that the proportion of wealthy is not more than one-half of 1 percent of the population of the entire Arab nation.

As for the effects of the boycott, the people have not yet felt them in earnest. However, a continuation of this boycott would put the Egyptian economy in a difficult position. Arab support is not limited to direct aid alone, estimated to be approximately \$2 billion. There are also revenues from tourism, business with Egyptian artists and the remittances of Egyptians working in Arab countries, etc.

There is a general feeling of anxiety as a result of this Arab stand. The man in the street feels that there is something incomprehensible about this stand, especially with regard to certain Arab nations. The question which comes to mind is, "If all the Arab nations have rejected this treaty, then there is something wrong with it."

[Question] What about the open-door policy toward Israel?

[Answer] The Egyptian people do not welcome these steps, and they are not happy about the presence of an Israeli ambassador in Cairo. Begin was not welcomed during his visit. The people watch what is happening as if it were an accomplished, inevitable fact.

[Question] And the talks on autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza?

[Answer] Egypt has handed over everything in advance and no longer has anything to bargain over. Obviously Israel does what it pleases. It has its own idea about autonomy. Therefore these talks are proceeding down a dead-end road.

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GOVERNORS GAIN POWER FROM GOVERNMENT DECENTRALIZATION LAW

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 17 Jul 79 p 3

[Article: "Road Toward Decentralization Is Open: First, by Law; the Executive Organ"]

[Text] Yesterday the People's Assembly began debating the new law on local government, and with it we are entering an advanced stage of democracy and decentralization. Centralized powers will be transferred to the local governments. Local people's assemblies will be given powers of supervision, control and follow-up over local facilities, and they will have the right to build and manage them and the power to issue resolutions which will bring new life to their local societies.

We will begin here today with the executive organs.

The executive organs have gained broad authority with respect to their responsibilities. Many of the difficulties which were "inherent" in the previous law have been overcome in this law.

This is not surprising, for the committee responsible for amending the old law included a group of experts in local government, some of whom have had practical experience since the beginning of 1961. They are Sa'd Ma'mun, governor of Cairo who was chairman; Muhammad 'Uthman Isma'il, governor of Asyut; Ahmad al-Qasbi, governor of al-Charbiyah; Ahmad Kamal al-Qal'awi, undersecretary of the Ministry of Local Government and former governor of Ismailia; Labit Zamzam, undersecretary of the Ministry of local Government; and the legal counselors of the cabinet, the Local Government Secretariat and the Cairo Governorate.

New dimensions were given to the law when it was debated before being issued by all the republic's governors at a meeting called by Engr Sulayman Mitavalli, minister of cabinet affairs and local government. It was chaired by Prime Minister Mustafa Khalil. During this meeting the bill which the committee had drafted was debated, and amendments were made on the basis of the expertise of the entire group. The prime minister was eager to issue the law which

would fulfill the wish to expand the democratic base and achieve decentralization in order to promote the national activity which this stage requires.

With this, we come to our main subject. We find that there are new trends in improving the law which aim at achieving this goal. The experts in local government say that with them, many of the restrictions which limited the movement of the executive organs in the past have been overcome. These amendments are:

1. Council of Governors. It was decided to establish this council under the chairmanship of the prime minister. Its members are the minister of local government and the governors. The chairman may invite any minister or any other person he deems appropriate to the sessions of the council. This council replaces the ministerial committee on local government. The existence of this council undoubtedly provides contact and coordination at the highest level between the planning authority represented by the cabinet and ministers of the central government and the local authority represented by the governors, and this ultimately is the required catalyst for implementing the nation's central government plans as well as the local plans undertaken by the local governments. Also, the directives of President Anwar al-Sadat that this council meet once per month greatly increase the potential for following up all projects and plans and eliminate any obstacle blocking implementation. The council also has the function and authority to study all matters submitted to it by the prime minister.

Building and Managing Public Utilities.

2. Building and managing all public utilities located within the sphere of the local units. This trend is the nerve of local government, since the local units are directly responsible for building and managing public utilities, each in its jurisdiction and within the limits of the overall policy and the nation's overall plan. It is a clear confirmation of the transfer of the jurisdiction of the central ministries to the local governments, with the exception of national utilities. A resolution issued by the prime minister provided that these be considered national utilities belonging to the central government, since it has the means to manage them, and the services of these utilities are spread out in a network throughout all the governorates, as is the case of the railroad. Thus the sound approach is the central management of these national utilities, though the legislators have also given the local governments a limited role in connection with these utilities. It may be defined by the following two points:

First, make observations and propose the necessary solutions with regard to production and superior performance.

Second, assume responsibility for protecting the security of these utilities.

Integration of Local Government Structure

3. Economic regions and planning organization. The law has brought this trend into effect, confirming the integration of the local government structure at all levels of its units. The local government structure used to end with the governorate under the previous law, even though the creation of the units was authorized. The republic has been divided into economic regions, each of which includes one or more governorates. Each region has a capital, and there is a supreme regional planning committee in each economic region under the chairmanship of the governor of the regional capital. Committee members are the governors of each of the governorates which make up the region, the heads of the local people's assemblies of those governorates, the head of the Regional Planning Organization, and representatives of the ministries concerned. A resolution is issued by the competent minister with everyone's consent.

This committee is responsible for:

- a. Coordinating the governorates' plans and setting priorities which are proposed by the regional planning organization and used as a basis in establishing allowances for the region's plan, in the light of revenues available at the local and central government levels.
- b. Examining regular reports to follow up on the implementation of the plan; studying the amendments to the plan proposed by the regional planning organization in accordance with the circumstances under which the plan is implemented; and submitting the recommendations made by the committee to the Council of Governors,

Also among the new trends in the law is the linking of local governments at all levels to local as well as central planning, in order to create a tie which will ultimately achieve the goals of development through implementation of the plan.

The law pointed to the creation of a regional planning organization, under the minister of planning, in every economic region. It is responsible for conducting the necessary research and studies to determine the region's means and resources, both natural and human, and ways to develop them and use them ideally; proposes the projects essential to the economic and social development of the region; and prepares the technical apparatus necessary for conducting studies, research and planning activities on the regional level.

Broad Authority for the Governors

4. The governors. In the opinion of the local government experts, the new law has given the governors greater powers than they had under the previous law. The governor has become directly responsible for managing all the public utilities in the sphere of his governorate, with the exception of the national utilities. The governor has the right to build and manage utilities, since he represents the peak of executive authority in the governorate. Thus the

new law has given governors broad powers to achieve decentralization, and among them are Articles 26 and 27.

a. The governor is considered to represent the president of the republic in the governorate. He is entrusted with executing the overall policy of the state and is responsible for ensuring security in foodstuffs and raising the capability of both agricultural and industrial production in the governorate.

b. The governor is responsible for security, morality and public values in the governorate, and is assisted in this by the director of security within the framework of the policy set down by the minister of interior. It is up to the director of security to discuss plans with the governor concerning the maintenance of security in the governorate in order to apply them. The director of security must notify him immediately of important events so that the necessary measures may be drafted by mutual agreement between them. The governor takes all steps to ensure the protection of both state and private property and to eliminate all infractions through the administrative process.

c. With regard to all the public utilities which fall within the jurisdiction of the local government units, the governor assumes all the powers and executive authority assigned to ministers. In his jurisdiction, the governor is the chief of all the local bodies and utilities, and he is also the head of all the workers in the sphere of the governorate. He exercises all the powers of a minister with regard to all the workers within the governorate in the administrative agencies whose jurisdiction has been entrusted to the local government units. The governor has the authority of a minister with regard to the decisions issued by the boards of the state organizations responsible for public utilities for services in the governorate. He also has the authority of a minister with regard to the supervision of all branches of ministries whose jurisdiction has not been transferred to the local government, with the exception of judicial bodies and their supporting agencies. In the ministries where jurisdiction has not been transferred to local government units, the ministers concerned may entrust the governor with some of their authority.

d. With the consent of the Council of Governors and within the limits of the general rules described by the Council of Governors, a governor may establish the rules for disposing of both lands intended for construction and belonging to the state and local government units within the sphere of the governorate and abandoned arable lands. He may also establish the rules for reclaiming land, distributing the land after it is reclaimed, and furnishing it with public utilities, without restriction by the guidelines set down in the laws and regulations, on condition that priority be given in disposing of this land to the people who live in the governorate and work in its administration. These rules may govern the cases when the land is disposed of without remuneration for the purposes of reconstruction, housing and land reclamation.

The experts feel that this text confirms the responsibility of governors concerning the necessity of promoting the policy of the security of foodstuffs and raising production capability, and it gives governors the potential for

thinking up and proposing housing projects to contribute to the solution of the crisis.

Assistants to the governor and executive councils. The new law has given the authority and jurisdiction of ministry undersecretary to the assistants of the governor in positions in the secretariat general of the governorate and to the chiefs of districts, cities and quarters in financial and administrative matters of the agencies and the budget of every local unit. The village chief has been given the same authority as that granted the department head. The law has provided for the establishment of executive councils in every local government unit (governorate, district, city, quarter and village), and the secretariat general of the unit is to be their authorized representative. They assume a number of powers, the most important of which are to follow up work entrusted to the executive organs, evaluate the level of performance and execution of projects and services, prepare a draft budget, propose the distribution of allocations for investments after authorization by the local units, assist heads of units in establishing administrative and financial plans which ensure the smooth flow of work in administrative agencies, plus other functions. The law has created a link between the jurisdiction of the supreme councils, such as the Council of Governors, and the district council and the cities and villages, with a view to coordinating state and local plans and projects.

However, a question still remains. With all the powers and responsibilities of the governors and heads of the new local units, who is responsible for the accounting of each of them?

We find that the law has answered this in several places, both directly and indirectly. For example, the governor is responsible to the prime minister in exercising his powers. He submits to the prime minister periodic reports on the results of work in the various activities pursued by the governorate and on any issues which require coordination with the ministries concerned.

Also, a member of the local people's assembly of the governorate has the right to ask questions about matters falling within the jurisdiction of the governor or any of the heads of departments and state organizations within the sphere of the governorate. Assembly members may also ask for information from the governor and the heads of departments and state organizations, with the understanding that it is of general, immediate importance in the affairs which fall within their jurisdiction.

Consequently, the heads of local units are also responsible to the governor. Also, in connection with their responsibilities, members of the local people's assemblies have the right to ask questions and demand information of the heads of local units.

We still have before us the position of popular organs with regard to the law.

BALUCHI REGION: LAND OF OPPRESSION

Tehran AYANDEGAN in Persian 31 Jul 79 p 9

[Article: "No Political and Religious Group in Baluchestan Advocates 'Secession'"]

[Text] The Democratic Organization of the People of Baluchestan has stated the following in a communique released on the occasion of the visit to Baluchestan of Ayatollah Khameneyi, representing the Government:

"Instead of getting in touch with the Baluchi people, Ayatollah Khameneyi established contact with local reactionary elements, including Haj Karim-Bakhsh Sa'idi tribe."

The Organization has further claimed, that according to an agreement, he has been given 800 pieces of arms, to enable him to preserve the security of the area, but "instead of preserving security, Karim-Bakhsh Sa'idi usurped the district of Karambid, and was even planning to carry away the equipment of Kanarak base, which was prevented by the people."

This Organization has claimed also, that Seyyed Ahmad Khordegir, the notorious torturer of SAVAK, is enjoying the protection of certain 'khan's of the area. In the meantime, attacks have also been made on Movlavi Qumareddin, leader of the "Movlavi" [dervishes] sect of Iranshahr, and 'Abdol-Vahed Arnian, leader of the Justice-seeking Front of Baluchestan.

The Democratic Organization of the People of Baluchestan has condemned the suggestion of Danesh Naruyi, Governor General of Sistan-Baluchestan, to the effect that the former deputies of the Majles should be exempted from repaying their salaries received in the previous years. The Organization has, in a second statement, proposed that councils be formed in the schools, corporations, government and military organizations, as well as in the rural districts and cities of Baluchestan. Also, it has expressed its opposition to appointments made from "above," and all kinds of dictatorial attitudes, including censorship, have been condemned.

The Organization is of the opinion, that the properties and belongings of antirevolutionary elements and local reactionaries should be confiscated and transferred to the Revolution Council.

Struggle against all types of "secession," and opposition to anti-revolutionary and local reactionary elements, aimed at restoring the rights of the Baluchi people, are additional points brought up in that statement. Present government authorities in Baluchestan, especially Ebrahim Mobaraki, Rigi and Gomshadzehi, have also been criticized by the Organization.

The supporters of the Organization have written slogans on the city-walls of Zahedan as follows:

"The Baluchi people will continue its struggle until it attains autonomy"; "The leader of the Kurdish and Baluchi peoples is 'Ezredin Hoseyni"; "Secessionist movement will perish, but autonomy will be victorious."

Other Activity Groups:

The Moslems' Unity Party is another active organization in Baluchestan, which has a great many supporters among the people, and especially among the "khan"s.

The party in question operates under Movlavi 'Abdol-'Aziz, and the aim pursued by it, according to the leader of the party, is to organize the Moslems, and create unity between the Shi'ite and Sonnite sects. All of the followers of the "Movlavi" [dervishes] sect resident in various cities of Baluchestan are supporters of this party, and are engaged in propagating its principles among the masses. Movlavi Nazar-Mohammad, resident in Saravan, Movlavi Sattar and Movlavi Yar-Mohammad in Khash, and Movlavi Qamareddin in Iranshahr, are active supporters of this party.

Some time ago a statement was issued by this party, in which Imam Khomeyni's leadership had been praised, and, in the meantime, it contained an expression of protest against Principle 13 of the Draft Constitution. The party had demanded to eliminate the mention of the Shi'ite and Sonnite sects, especially when it came to the election of the President of the Islamic State.

The Moslems' Unity Party is opposed to Communism whatever its name, form and shape might be, and it condemns the policies adopted by the Soviets and Taraki in Afghanistan.

The branch of this party in Saravan, during a rally held on 20 June of the current year, and attended by Movlavi Nazar Mohammad, required to stop circulating accusations directed against Sonnite leaders, in order to prevent dissension among the followers of Islam. It was also emphasized, that

the Governor General should be granted full powers by the Government, and in order to prevent poverty and deviation of the people of Baluchestan, jobs and employment should be provided for them, and efforts should be made to revive and promote agricultural activities.

The Khash Tribes also, affiliated with the Moslems' Unity Party, during their third meeting in May of the current year, held in the city of Khash, requested that Ayatollah Taleqani set up a representation in the provincial capital of Sistan and Baluchestan. Also they presented a request to the Governor General, asking him to bring into existence a committee, aimed at creating order in the area. This branch, following in the footsteps of Movlavi 'Abdol-'Aziz, the leader of the party, has also requested autonomy for Baluchestan, under the leadership of Imam Khomeyni.

In addition to these two groups, there exist also a number of other organizations in the province of Sistan-Baluchestan as follows: "Da-Neshjuyan-e Mosalman-e Baluch" [Moslem Baluchi Students' Party]; "Jame'e-Ye Sistaniha" [Society of Sistanis]; "Sazeman-e Javanan-e Pishtar-e Mojahedin-e Baluch" [Organization of Progressive "Mojahedin" of Baluchi Youths], and "Jebhe-Ye 'Adalatkha" [Justice-seeking Front]. These groups, for the most part, exercise influence and are active in areas close to the urban districts of Zabol.

Another group, consisting of active elements operating especially in the cultural field, is the organization of "Daneshjuyan-e Pishgam-e Daneshgari-e Baluchestan" [Vanguard Students of the University of Baluchestan]. In a statement released by this group, the reactionary elements of the university have been condemned, because they have been requiring the dissolution of the university and the dismissal of the University Council. The statement goes on to say, that SAVAK elements of the university, contrary to other universities, have not yet been purged.

All of these groups, listed above, advocate the concept of autonomy within the framework of Iran, and they all condemn secessionism, and continue to wage a struggle against secessionists.

Insurgents -- real nuisance for Baluchi people:

The nuisance and insurgency of a large number of highway robbers in Baluchestan have had their deep impact on the creation of discontent and complaints among the inhabitants of Baluchestan and Sistan.

The armed group called "nar-gorazan," headed by Rasulbakhsh and 'Azam, has made life unbearable for the inhabitants of Chah-Bahar and Kanarak, by its continuous acts of seizing hostages, threats, intimidations and robberies. The population of these two cities have often asked the government to have those elements suppressed and liquidated.

Damages caused by armed groups of robbers, who are undoubtedly being backed and strengthened by a number of "khan"s and puppet elements of the U.S. imperialism, are leaving their impact through the entire area of Baluchestan and Sistan, and, as a result, most events of a mysterious nature are being ascribed to them. For example, in the last week of April of this year a gendarmerie Range Rover vehicle was attacked by a number of suspicious elements at kms 5 of Iranshahr--Chahderaz road. One soldier was killed, and 2 gendarmes were injured. The intent of the assailants was to disarm the military personnel.

During the last week of July of the current year, 4 jeeps and mountain-station vehicles, carrying 15 gunmen and a large number of club-wielding persons, headed by Shahmak (Shahmorad), entered the city of Saravan, and under the guise of Islam, they began to shout: "Islam is victorious, and Communism has been annihilated." They then attacked 2 book-stores, and the city library which had recently been established by the youths of the city. The librarian was then forced to set the books on fire. At the time when Shahmak's group was within the city, its personnel were not pursued and arrested by the armed officials of the police, and the patrols hid themselves in a shop when they noticed the members of the group. Commenting on the assault, one teacher at Saravan made this remark: Shahmak is an instrument in the hands of the "khan"s and is their agent. By such moves they intend to create terror and harassment among the people, and by exploiting the religious sentiments of the inhabitants, to stage a display of power, aimed at reviving the feudal system of the "khan"s, which had recently been endangered by a number of struggling Baluchi and Sistani youths."

Shahmak is one of the notorious insurgents of the Saravan region, and is resident at the village of Bamposht. He is the man involved in the robbery of the Suran village bank in Saravan, and a number of other cases of theft and highway robberies.

According to a large number of inhabitants of the area, once he killed two people for personal matters, and the "khan"s have always used him against their opponents.

In the reign of the former regime he had undergone training at Baghdad for guerrilla warfare, and after re-entering Iran he was arrested, and became a SAVAK agent serving in Baluchestan. Since that time he has committed many crimes against local intellectuals, in accordance with directives given to him by SAVAK.

CSO: 4906

POSSIBILITIES OF SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON EXPLORED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 27 Jul 79 pp 12-13

[Article by Talim al-Lawzi: "After Secret Agreement Concluded by al-Sadat and Begin, When Will Syrians Decide to Withdraw From Lebanon?"]

[Text] The statements made by Ilyahu Ben Elisar, the general director of Menachem Begin's office, are still causing reverberations in Syria and Lebanon and even going beyond them to the Arab capitals. It is as if the man made his statements only to create the tremors that these statements have created. Of all the political and military agreements concluded by Israel's prime minister with Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat and described by Menachem Begin as the most important agreements he has concluded since attaining power, Dr Ben Elisar has only wished to reveal the content of the agreement on the unity of the Lebanese territories. In a statement to the JERUSALEM POST, published in English, Ben Elisar said: "This declaration means that Egypt and Israel want the Syrian army to withdraw from Lebanon and that the Syrians must take this decision into consideration when they make their calculations!"

When asked: What is Washington's position toward this agreement? Ben Elisar said: "I do not believe that Washington opposes Lebanon's unity. But I imagine sometimes that the Americans have become used to the Syrian presence in this country. Therefore, we have had to make our opinion on this issue heard to them."

Those who have met with the U.S. ambassador in Washington have cited him as saying that the U.S. position toward the Syrian presence in Lebanon has not changed. As long as President Ilyas Sarkis' government wishes the continued presence of these forces, the U.S. administration respects the wishes of the Lebanese legitimacy and finds no reason to object to them!

However, these statements do not negate the fact that the equation of the Syrian forces' presence in Lebanon has lost its balance. It is well-known that the Syrian forces entered Lebanon only after U.S. President Gerald Ford's administration had obtained approval from Yitzhak Rabin's government for the Syrian mission of restoring security to Lebanon and of obstructing

its partition. Until the agreement reached with Menachem Begin 10 days ago, Egypt was one of the five Arab countries that met in Riyadh in 1976 and agreed to give the Syrian military presence in Lebanon a comprehensive Arab cover. What is the impact of this change in the Israeli and Egyptian positions toward the Syrian military presence? Is the change a mere declaration of positions or does it go beyond to joint action, be it direct action (at the military level) or indirect action through shaking the earth of Lebanon under the feet of the Syrians? If the U.S. administration finds no reason to object to the wish of the Lebanese legitimacy for the continued of the Syrians for a period of 6 more months, then what is the position of the Syrian government--a position which constitutes the basis for any calculation?

It is difficult to understand the truth of the Syrian decision to stay in or withdraw from Lebanon without knowing the Syrian way of thinking. If we exclude the role of the Syrian moodiness in action and in forming relations, we find in Damascus two ways of thinking that, since the independence and until the present, characterize the Syrian relations with Lebanon and that govern Syria's actions. The first is the Arab culture which says that the Arab nation is a single nation, that Arab unity is an inevitable and indubitable destiny and that the Arab parts must again unite. Consequently, the Syrians view with sympathy action that unites any two separate Arab regions in a single entity. This thinking was prevalent in Syria before the rise of the Ba'th Party to power and has continued after this rise under the well-known slogan of: "One Arab nation with an immortal message."

The second kind of thinking is the military view that sees Lebanon as the one and only natural permanent path for any invasion seeking to reach Damascus. Those who uphold this military view present various equations on this issue and all of these equations stress that if Israel decides to invade Syria, it will definitely invade it by way of western al-Biqa'.

There are numerous currents and various viewpoints in Syria. But these two ways of thinking have governed and formed the unwritten constitution of Syria for dozens of years. Even under the rule of King Faysal ibn al-Husayn--a rule which did not last long before the French mandate was imposed--the Syrian thinking was a pan-Arab and military thinking in analyzing the nature of the relationship with Lebanon. When the Syrians regained their independence from the French, the pan-Arab reasoning and the military viewpoint returned to power. This has persisted throughout various regimes with different inclinations, some rightist and some leftist, some Damascene and some hailing from Hamah, some from the mountains and some coastal.

But on the other hand, neither the pan-Arab thinking nor the military culture have ruled in Lebanon. The Lebanese state has been governed by the obsession of the fear of Syria. This is why an atmosphere of the dialogue of the deaf has loomed over the Syrian-Lebanese relations. The only thread that linked the two countries till before the entrance of the armed Palestinian presence was Gen Fu'ad Shihab who, as a military man and a former

resident of Syria, understood the way in which the Syrian mind works and who succeeded in dealing with Syria.

From the time Fu'ad Shihab assumed the command of the army and until the time of his death, the military logic was the key to the dialogue with Syria. But Fu'ad Shihab dwelt more on dialogue than on reaching an understanding and postponed more than he accomplished on all matters pertaining to adopting the Syrian viewpoint on the questions of national unity between the two countries, military agreement on the Lebanese borders and Syria's responsibility to defend itself through these borders.

Fu'ad Shihab always held the view that he wanted to know the number of the military forces that Syria wanted to station along the Lebanese borders in case a border agreement was reached between Syria and Lebanon. He also wanted to know the type of weapons, the kind of training and the type of plan because, in Shihab's view, if Syria was incapable of waging a winning battle against Israel on the Lebanese borders, then peace, the international friendships and the relations with the United States, France and the Vatican would continue to be, despite their inadequacy, a better guarantee for Lebanon, for its borders, for its existence and for Syria itself than a military agreement that stations on the Israeli borders an Arab army insufficiently capable of confronting Israel.

General Shihab used to tell his Syrian friends that the biggest mistake that Hitler committed was his allowing Italy to enter the war on his side. Hitler thus ended up carrying two burdens rather than one. Had he left Italy to fight peacefully, he would have spared his armies for other borders.

This logic did not please the Syrians. But General Shihab's civility, his simple manner and his seniority in military rank pacified the Syrian insistence on the need to conclude an immediate bilateral agreement between Lebanon and Syria to prevent Israel from using Lebanon as a dagger in Syria's side.

However, pacification is one thing and defusing the explosive in a final manner is something else. This became clear when Syria planned to enter Lebanon, making use of the armed Palestinian presence and, consequently, of the transformation of the Lebanese fear of Syrians to a fear of the Palestinians. It thus became possible to accept the Syrians to alleviate the dangers caused by the armed Palestinian presence. The Syrian political and military thinking thus came to assume the position of the ruler capable of formulating the Lebanese-Syrian relations in the manner he wants.

But with the Syrian decision to enter Lebanon, two charges rose in the face of Syria: The first being the charge of interfering in the Palestinian affairs and the second being that of interfering in the Lebanese affairs.

Salah Jadid was accused in 1970 of interfering in Jordan's affairs when he tried to back up the fedayeen action when it was exposed to liquidation.

Hafiz al-Asad came to power because the charge of intervention against Salah Jadid was tantamount to a fatal blow to the man. U.S. President Richard Nixon stressed in the annual speech he addressed to the nation in 1971 that "the Syrian army's violation of the Jordanian borders was the most dangerous event threatening peace in the Middle East."

Now that the Syrian army entered Lebanon at the invitation of former Lebanese President Sulayman Franjiyah, with an American blessing, with an Israeli approval and with an Arab cover, Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad is facing two charges: The first is that of interfering in the Palestinian people's affairs and in their right to struggle for their identity and for their national goals (the late Kamal Junblat was the first to level such a charge). The second charge has come from the other side (after Kamal Junblat's assassination). Camille Sham'un, Pierre al-Jumayyil and the other leaders of the Lebanese Front have accused the Syrians of wanting to dominate Lebanon.

Even though these two charges have no direct military impact as long as the Lebanese legitimacy and the United States are satisfied with the Syrian military presence, the charges are effective and annoying in the international circles, excluding the Gaullist France. (Couve de Mourphille) says that Syria entered Lebanon in self-defense. A revolutionary market has been opened next to it and it has had to enter it, otherwise the leftist and Islamic Palestinian tide--a tide which has raised the slogan "of fighting the isolationists" and which has polarized the sentiments of the Arabs everywhere, especially the sentiments of Muslims in Syria--would swallow Syria.

Since President Ilyas Sarkis came to power, the dialogue between Damascus and Syria has been governed by two conflicting logics which must come to agreement. The Syrians tell the Lebanese president: "Control the country and we will be with you without any reservation. We have no interest in anything else." The Lebanese president replies: "Controlling the country is a Syrian, and not a Lebanese, concept of rule. Lebanon is a democratic country and its composition is not founded on the one-party or one-sect rule." This is why the president continues to be more of a referee than a ruler and why he continues to be compelled to safeguard the various wills and viewpoints, even though they may be conflicting and may weaken the rule at times.

Sarkis also says: I cannot act toward the country's leaders and parties like the Arab rulers act toward their countries' leaders and parties--that is if there still are leaders outside the government and parties other than the ruling party--not because I do not like power but because Lebanon has not known in the past and cannot withstand at present a formula that puts all the power in the hands of one individual. Moreover, the president of the republic of Lebanon is compelled at times to adopt the opinion of a prime minister whom the president selected of his own free will. This president finds himself like some artists who create idols and then worship

them, forgetting that they are the ones who made the idols with their own fingers and out of their own imagination. The status of the Lebanese prime minister is lost only when he accompanies his president to an Arab country. There, the prime minister assumes the same status of the local prime ministers who usually have no right to attend the presidential meetings and the summit retreats where resolutions are made and decisions agreed upon. When the Lebanese prime minister returns to Beirut, he heaves a sigh of relief, contrary to the president who immediately upon arrival feels that he is smaller in weight and ability. He cannot do with the country what he wants, unlike the other Arab presidents who have nothing to separate their will from their ability to implement and who tell something "be" and it comes into existence!

The Syrians reply: Then, the crisis in Lebanon will continue and this sectarian division will continue to exist. In this case, it must be understood that the Syrian people are a Muslim people and that this people do not permit us but to be next to their Muslim Lebanese brothers!

If this Syrian logic constitutes a justification for the continued Syrian military presence in Lebanon, then this presence has created a problem for Syria and not for Lebanon alone. This problem is an international problem primarily. As a result of its presence in Lebanon, Syria is compelled to be friendly with the two super powers who have not yet agreed on how to include Syria in the war of peace. Syria is in need of the United States primarily because the Lebanese quicksands belong to the United States which can sink whoever it wishes in them. This is why Dean Brown came to Lebanon and set up the Lebanese trap for Syria. If it weren't that the Palestinian resistance has seven lives, it would not have been able to fight until now the mouths of the quicksands which hardly subside in one spot before they start moving in another. As a result of its military and political presence in Lebanon, Syria is also in need of the Soviet Union to play the role of the middleman between Damascus on the one hand and the Lebanese and Palestinian left on the other. Hafiz al-Asad cannot thoroughly support the Muslims in Lebanon and he needs someone to market his policy in the Palestinian and leftist circles. This inevitable salesman is the Soviet Union. What is more, the confrontation with Israel in Lebanon requires rapprochement with the United States for enticement and rapprochement with the Soviet Union for intimidation.

Consequently, everything is mixed up regarding the outcome of the Syrian presence in Lebanon. If a clash takes place in Tripoli, al-'Aqurah or al-Batrun, it cannot be settled except in Washington. Whoever goes to Washington must usually leave a share for the Soviets. Thus, Geneva and conferences like it become necessary not for the basis (namely, the Golan, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) but for the subsidiaries--and how numerous are the subsidiaries in a country like Lebanon with complicated problems and entangled concerns, and even a country like Syria after its entry into Lebanon!

And now comes the Egyptian-Israeli agreement on the need for the Syrians to get out of Lebanon--the agreement described by Menachem Begin as one of

the most important agreements he has concluded since he assumed power in Israel--as a warning not only to the Syrians but also to the Americans and to the Lebanese legitimacy after the Syrians or through the Syrians, all the same.

Those who are aware of the real conditions in the United States, of President Carter's vacillation in adopting decisions at the right time and of the extent of the Jewish influence at a time when the United States is preparing for presidential elections give the new Egyptian-Israeli agreement no less importance than that given to the Egyptian-Israeli treaty. Perhaps al-Sadat and Begin's agreement on the need for the ouster of the Syrians from Lebanon is the first fruit of the treaty and, consequently, the first test of its reverberations in the area. Like Israel, if the treaty does not expand, it will suffocate.

This is why it is important to know or to evaluate the Syrian position. The decision to withdraw from Lebanon or to stay in it demands courage similar to the courage of the decision to enter Lebanon. If the reason for entering is to fight the fire in its place before it extends, then the decision to withdraw or to stay depends on calculations that are much more complicated than the calculations of fires and firefighting, than the concerns of the Muslims and of some Christians and than the luxury of the constant disagreement among the Palestinian resistance factions over accepting an amended resolution 242 or rejecting this resolution, amended or not.

Two months ago, Yitzhak Rabin, a former Israeli prime minister, published an article in (YEDI'OT AHORONOT) entitled: "What Is the Price That We Should Pay Syria to Withdraw From Lebanon?" In this article, Rabin said: "If President Carter's administration succeeds in persuading the Syrians to take part in the peace negotiations with Israel under the auspices of the United States, as has happened with Egypt, this would be an American victory whose shades will extend beyond the Middle East area. Otherwise, there is no possibility other than to exploit the weakness of the Syrian position to persuade Damascus that restoring full sovereignty to the legitimate Lebanese authority is the only solution to achieve a Syrian withdrawal without problems and without a confrontation which, definitely, is not in the interest of Damascus!"

But there is between theories and application a distance no shorter than the distance between the skill of getting embroiled in the Lebanese problems and the skill of getting out of these problems.

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ISRAEL NOT EXPECTED TO LET DETENTE BE ACHIEVED AMONG LEBANESE

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 27 Jul 79 p 14

[Article by Amin al-Siba'i: "Will Israel Permit the Achievement of Detente Among the Lebanese; Bahij Taqi-al-Din to President of Republic: We Don't Want You to Shoulder Responsibilities Alone"]

[Text] A number of deputies of the Independent Bloc led by Kam'l al-As'ad, Chamber of Deputies speaker, believe that the estrangement between the [presidential] palace and al-As'ad harms the simplest rules of cooperation among the constitutional powers, especially since the palace exerted great efforts before succeeding in making al-As'ad visit the palace on the day when the decree forming the government was issued to end an estrangement which lasted several weeks. However, al-As'ad refused to have a memorial photograph taken of him with the members of the cabinet on the pretext that summoning the ministers to the palace just to have a picture taken is something that does not befit the prevailing situation.

It has been revealed that a mediation was made by Bahij Taqi-al-Din, the minister of interior and tourism, a few days before issuance of the decree entrusting Prime Minister Salim al-Huss to form the cabinet.

Taqi-al-Din discussed with President Sarkis the issue of his disagreement with Kamil al-As'ad and suggested to him resumption of the dialogue because dialogue alone is capable of solving the problems.

President Sarkis replied: I have no objection, even though both Speaker al-As'ad and Prime Minister al-Huss cling to their positions and refuse to swerve from them.

Bahij Taqi-al-Din arranged for a meeting between Speaker Kamil al-As'ad and Prime Minister Salim al-Huss at the wedding ceremony of a youth from the Qaddurah family because he wanted the meeting to look spontaneous.

During this meeting, the three discussed their complaints and agreed as a result to hold a meeting at the Republican Palace to discuss the proper solutions with President Sarkis.

The desired meeting was held at the palace and was attended by President Sarkis, Prime Minister al-Huss, Minister Fu'ad Butrus, Bahij Taqi-al-Din and Deputy Rene Mu'awwad.

At the outset of the discussion, President Sarkis said: It must be clear to all that I do not accept the formation of a political cabinet that does not include representatives of the National Liberals and of the Phalanges.

Bahij Taqi-al-Din replied: We hope that this about which you are talking will be realized. But what can we do if its realization is impossible? Should the country remain without a government because the positions are governed by prior decisions that are difficult to implement?

President Sarkis said: You acted hastily in the Chamber of Deputies when you pushed the previous government to resign.

Taqi-al-Din replied: I do not believe that we acted hastily. The previous government had come to rule for 6 months and went on to rule for 2.5 years, even though it admitted its failure. Didn't you, Mr al-Huss, state repeatedly that you failed?

Prime Minister al-Huss replied: Yes, in fact we did not succeed.

Bahij Taqi-al-Din went on to say: So the Chamber of Deputies had to make a move to correct the situation. So, why don't you respond to it and why do you believe that Speaker Kamil al-As'ad formed the Independent Parliamentary Bloc to control the parliamentary majority and to impose his decisions on you? The Independent Bloc was born as an idea at a meeting that we held at the residence of colleague Mikha'il al-Dahir. We then conveyed this idea to Speaker al-As'ad and he supported it. Is it possible that we did this with the aim of imposing our will on the Republican Palace? Moreover, why should you, mr president, shoulder the responsibility for all matters? Why should you remain alone in the forefront of the government? Why don't you entrust Prime Minister al-Huss to form the government and so you will rest and he will rest?

President Sarkis said: I am ready to entrust him now. Here I am telling him in front of you: leave the hall now and tell the journalists outside that you have been entrusted with forming the government.

At this point, Prime Minister al-Huss said: We must first agree on the details.

Bahij Taqi-al-Din replied: Committing the mistake of prior conditions obstructs the attempt to reach the goal because between the condition of forming a parliamentary cabinet injected with some technocrats and the condition of forming a cabinet of technocrats injected with some deputies, the issue gets lost and the wills get paralyzed. Leave the details for the contacts, consultations and efforts that come after the assignment.

Prime Minister al-Huss requested that the assignment be postponed for a few days so that he may hold some necessary consultations. He was given the chance, the efforts were continued and ended with assigning him and with forming the cabinet.

The conflicting proposals played a major role in changing the composition of the government before it was born.

It was thought at the outset to include ex-President Charles Hilu as minister of state with the task of seeking to achieve detente in return for [muqabil] entrusting the same task to an Islamic personality, such as Taqi-al-Din al-Sulh.

At a party given by the French Embassy on 14 July on occasion of the French National Day, ex-President Charles Hilu took Taqi-al-Din al-Sulh aside and presented to him the idea of participation by both of them as ministers of state in the cabinet.

Taqi-al-Din al-Sulh declined tactfully and told President Hilu that his feelings, before his reason, make him decline for many reasons, including the fact that Hilu's participation in the government will solve an important part of the problem of Maronite representation whereas there is no problem insofar as the Sunni Islamic representation is concerned.

Ex-President Hilu asked Taqi-al-Din al-Sulh for his advice and the latter said: Continue your task and agree to participate in the cabinet as minister of state because your presence makes a contribution, regardless of how closed are the paths in the face of understanding.

It was noticed that ex-President Hilu's conversation with Taqi-al-Din al-Sulh at the French embassy stemmed from personal ideas because no official had offered al-Sulh a cabinet seat and because al-Sulh was not thinking of agreeing to the offer if made to him. He stated this clearly to most members of the Islamic Bloc who contacted him after issuance of the decrees forming the government to express their anger over the absence of a Sunni from Beirut from the cabinet for the first time. Those members also expressed to him the apprehension that this action was a link in the chain of fragmenting the ability of the sects and of tampering with the conventional national balance in favor of one faction to the exclusion of another.

The fundamental result that has begun to appear after the exclusion of this kind of ministerial plans and formulas is the reduced hope in the possibilities of success by the cabinet in extending the bridges of national dialogue among the Lebanese. This result is also embodied in focusing the attention on the hope that this government will succeed in dealing with the telephone, water, electricity, inflation and traffic problems.

At a private gathering, Deputy Fu'ad al-Tahini told some people who were talking about national detente: How can you imagine that a state like

Israel will permit a number of ministers to jump over its plans and aspirations and to achieve detente among the Lebanese? Rest assured that there will be no detente and that such a government does not have the ability to achieve this miracle or to jump over the red lines. Therefore, it would be enough honor for it to tell the Lebanese in the future: I have succeeded in dealing with the telephone problem and in separating this problem from the Middle East crisis, from Camp David and from the Carter-Brezhnev meeting. Then, the Lebanese will raise their hats for it in respect and gratitude.

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YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

COMMITTEES FOR REFORM OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES ARE FORMED

San'a' AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 23, 30 Jul 79

[23 Jul 79, p 1]

[Text] The supreme council for the reform of government agencies and offices convened a round table talk yesterday morning under the leadership of Husayn 'Abdullah al-Muqaddami, secretary general of the council. During the meeting discussions of the gradual problem positions of the work schedule were concluded; included in them were the nominations of the main reform committees.

A decision to formulate the following committees was made: The main reform committee for the office of the president and prime minister is comprised of;

Ahmed Qasim Damsj
Muqdam 'Abd al-Hamid al-'Alafi
'Abd al-Risaq
Yahya 'Abdullah al-Qusati

Naqib Tayyar 'Abd al-Malik Ahmed
al-Jibri
Muhammad Qasim al-Ansi
Muhammad Ahmed al-Hayai
Yahya Yasin Muhammad
Husayn Muhammad

The principal committee for the reform of the ministries of supply and economy as well as the public sector and mixed sector, comprised of:

'Alawi al-Salami
Fadil 'Ali al-Ahwa'
Nasim 'Abd al-Rahman Bakr
Hamud Muhammad al-Shabani
Lutf Hamud al-Habburi

Ahmed 'Ali Marghim
Muhammad al-Jaifi
Muhammad 'Abdullah al'Amari
Ahmed Shukri al-Shaybani

The principal committee for the reform of the ministry of communications and the air and land transport agencies, comprised of:

Ra'id Muhammad Daifullah
'Ali Ahmed Ishaq
Muhammad 'Abdullah al-Kuhlani
Ra'id Salih Abu Bakr Muhammad
Ahmed Hasan Sabra

Ra'id 'Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar
Qasim 'Ali al-Misri
Tayyar Muhammad 'Abdu Muhammad
Hamid Mukrid al-Sharif

The principal committee for the reform of the ministry of agriculture and the public union for national cooperatives for development, comprised of:

Qa'id 'Abdu al-Harawi
Naqib Sadiq Asin Abu Ras
Muhandas Muqbil Ahmad Muqbil
Dr 'Ali al-Shatibi
Dr Husayn al-Fasil

Ra'id 'Ali Muqbil Ghathim
Muhandas 'Abdullah Ahmad al-Hushayshi
Ra'id Ahmad Ahmad Daifullah Shamila
Ra'id Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdi

The principal committee for the reform of the ministry of public works and the central planning organization, comprised of:

'Abd al-Rahman Hamid
Salah al-A'jam
Sharf al-Saidi
'Abdullah al-Hadrami
Ra'id Muhammad 'Ali Sa'id

'Ali Qasim al-Murid
'Ali Ahmad al-Harazi
Muhammad Muhammad al-Fadli
'Ali 'Abdullah al-Muqdar

[30 Jul 79, p 2]

[Text] San'a', 30 Jul 79--The Supreme Council for Reform of the Government held a second meeting yesterday morning under the chairmanship of Husayn Al-Muqaddami, secretary general of the council. The council reviewed the visit which the secretary general and members of the oversight committee had made to the provinces of Ibb and Qa'tabah under the orders of President 'Ali 'Abdullah Salih. They also discussed the graduated steps of the work schedule, and decided to form the following principle committees:

The principle committee for the Ibb Governorate composed of:

Major Husayn Yahya al-Kharashi
Muhammad 'Ali al-Ribbadi
Major Yahya Muhammad al-Shami
al-Qadi Ahmad al-Mujahid
Hasan 'Abd al-Rahman al-Haddad

'Ali 'Abd al-Qadr al-Sufi
'Abdullah Ahmad al-Sayyati
Muhammad Ahmad al-Rassas
'Abdullah 'Ali al-Da'ish

The principle committee for reform of Fiscal Affairs, Customs, Taxes and Duties, and the Public Office for Employees and Bureaucrats' Affairs, composed of the following:

'Abdullah Muhammad An'am al'Shur'abi
'Abd al-Ghani Ahmad 'Aqlan
Zaid Muhammad Zaid
'Abdullah 'Abd al-Jabbar Murshid
'Adel 'Abd al-Qadr Khursid

Mansur Muhammad al-Sharif
Ahmad Sa'id al-Damashqi
Ahmad Husayn Basha
Ahmad Ibrahim Jahhaf

The principle committee for the reform of the Ministry of Education and Upbringing, the university, the Ministry of Social Affairs, Work and Youth; composed of the following:

Dr Yusuf Muhammad 'Abdullah
'Abdullah 'Ali Al-Kamir
Dr Muhammad 'Abdu Ghanim
Ahmad Muhammad al-Shabibi
'Ali Muhammad Salih Qa'id

al-Qadi 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Sammawi
'Ali Muhammad 'Abdu
'Ali Salih 'Abbad
'Ali 'Abd al-Karim al-Sabbahi

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